# On the Performance of Percolation Graph Matching

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#### COSN Oct 2013



## **Privacy of Networks**

#### Adversary has:

- Anonymized network: unlabeled graph
- Side information: labeled graph similar but not identical



# **Graph Matching Applications**

#### Social networks:

Correlating different domains



#### Security:

Identifying computer viruses by function-call patterns

#### Computer vision:

Segment adjacency graph to find similar images

## G(n, p; s) Sampling Model



## G(n, p; s): Two Correlated G(n, ps)'s



# Result 1: GM is Easy with $\infty$ Resources

### • Theorem [PG11]:

For the G(n, p; s) matching problem, if



then  $G_{1,2}$  can be perfectly matched a.a.s.

#### Interpretation:

- Surprisingly weak condition: degree growing faster than ~log n enough to break anonymity
- Decrease with s only quadratic

## Mappings and Edge Mismatch



# Approach

#### Assumption:

- Attacker has infinite computational power
- Can try all possible mappings  $\pi$  and compute edge mismatch function  $\Delta(\pi)$

#### Question:

Are there conditions on p,s such that

$$P\left\{\pi_0 \text{ unique } \min \text{ of } \Delta(\pi)\right\} \rightarrow 1$$

 If yes: adversary would be able to match vertex sets only through the structure of the two networks!

Note:

 G(n, p; s) model: statistically uniform, low clustering, degree distribution not skewed -> conjecture: harder than real networks

### **Result 2: Graph Matching with Seeds**



## Questions

- How many seeds are needed?
- Is there a phase transition?
- How efficiently can we match?
- Tuning parameters?



Figure 2. The fraction of nodes re-identified depend sharply on the number of seeds. Node overlap: 25° Edge overlap: 50%

From [A. Narayanan, V. Shmatikov, "De-anonymizing social networks", IEEE Symp. on Security and Privacy, 2009]

## **Percolation Graph Matching Algorithm**



## Result: Seed Set Size Threshold for G(n, p; s)

Theorem 2: phase transition in # seeds a

• For 
$$n^{-1} \ll ps^2 \ll s^2 n^{-\frac{4}{r}}$$
:

• If 
$$\frac{a}{a_c} \to \alpha < 1$$
, final map is  $o(n)$  w.h.p.

• If 
$$\frac{a}{a_c} > \alpha > 1$$
, final map is  $n - o(n)$  w.h.p.

Seed set size threshold:

• 
$$a_c = (1 - r^{-1}) \left(\frac{(r-1)!}{n(ps^2)^r}\right)^{1/(r-1)}$$

- Slowly densifying network: constant r
- Growth of a<sub>c</sub>: a bit less than linear
  - $p = \log n/n$ , s fixed  $\rightarrow a_c \propto n (\log n)^{-r/(r-1)}$

## Bootstrap Percolation for G(n, p)

Activation from r neighbors



[S. Janson, T. Luczak, T. Turova, T. Vallier, Bootstrap Percolation on the Random Graph G(n, p), Annals Applied Prob., 22(5), 2012] <sup>13</sup>

## **Giant Component: Branching Process**



### **Bottleneck in Bootstrap Percolation**



### Simulation of PGM with G(n, p; s) Network



## Simulation of PGM with G(n, p; s) Network



### **Slashdot Social Network**



# **Result 3: Getting Started**

#### How to find seeds? [PFG13]

- Efficient (polynomial) algorithm to generate seed set
- Does not work for G(n, p)

#### Real graphs:

- More heterogeneous than G(n, p): degree skew, transitivity
- Provides features for nodes



### Finding Seeds: Bayesian Framework



### Seed: Bayesian Framework



## Conclusion

### Graph matching problem:

- Social networks: privacy; merging
- Model as noisy graph isomorphism problem
- How much information in network structure?
- G(n, p; s) random graph model:
  - Parsimonious: density (p), similarity (s)
  - Information-theoretic characterization of feasible region condition is quite mild

### Percolation Graph Matching algorithm:

- Simple algorithm, propagating evidence over node pairs
- Actually works very well in practice; parsimonious (r)

### Analysis:

 Sharp phase transition in seed set size (a), confirms empirical observation